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ver the past few decades, nuclear 
weapons have been regarded as an 
intolerable threat to international 
security and humanity. A nuclear weapons 
attack has the ability to destroy entire cities and 
kill billions of people, while also harming 
future generations and jeopardizing the natural 
environment through its long-term catastrophic 
effects (United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs). The spread of nuclear 
weapons and the risk of a nuclear attack has 
alarmed the international community. As a 
result, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) was established in 1968 to curtail the 
spread of nuclear weapons by promoting 
cooperation amongst international state actors. 
Despite the establishment of the NPT, the last 
decade has seen the addition of three new, 
publicly acknowledged nuclear states, namely, 
India, Pakistan and North Korea (Kreiger 369). 
Iran has also publicly expressed high ambitions 
to create nuclear power. However, there are 
states who have refrained from weaponizing 
their nuclear energy such as Saudi Arabia, 
Afghanistan, and Palestine. The question then 
becomes: why do some states choose to pursue 
nuclear weapons and others do not?  
       In this paper, there will be an emphasis on 
why some nations in the Middle East 
weaponize their nuclear energy and why others 
decide not to. Theories regarding nuclear 
proliferation act as a tool to help understand the 
motivations behind a state’s decision to acquire 
nuclear weapons. A state’s commitment to 
proliferation should be seen less as a singular 
decision and more as a process that may be 
influenced by national security reasons, 
domestic political interests, and national 
prestige. The comparative methodological 
approach will be employed to understand the 
significance of nuclear proliferation in Israel, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. The case studies will 
begin with a brief history of each state’s 
nuclear weapons program and will assess the 
motivations for pursuing and maintaining 
nuclear weapons. More importantly, the case 
studies will focus on how the United States’ 
presence and interests in the Middle East 
caused some Middle Eastern nations to obtain 
nuclear weapons. Ultimately, the international 
relations theories of Liberalism and 
Constructivism will be rejected as the 
determining factors of nuclear proliferation. 
This paper will argue that Realism and United 
States’ interests and alliances are the two 
determining factors to explain the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons by some countries in the 
Middle East.  	LITERATURE	REVIEW								Since the creation of the first nuclear bomb 
by the United States in the 1940s, strategists 
and analysts have sought to explain why some 
countries choose to militarize their nuclear 
power and why others choose to refrain. The 
O		
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conventional view of proliferation is that a 
country, at some point, makes an explicit 
decision to seek nuclear weapons. Next, the 
country launches a secret program and finally 
achieves nuclear status by testing a device on 
a particular date. In reality, the path to nuclear 
weapons capability requires many important 
and complex choices along the way (Davidson 
20). The complexity of nuclear proliferation 
cannot be summarized in one simple 
international theory or model. Instead, existing 
literature revolves around the three 
fundamental international relations schools of 
thought with a primary focus on the 
perspective of nuclear weapons. Each theory 
and framework helps to provide an 
explanation of the causes and motivations of 
some Middle Eastern nations desire to become 
nuclear power states.  
       The traditionally dominant theory 
regarding the motivations for states to pursue 
nuclear weapons revolves around the security 
model or the international theory of Realism. 
Scott Sagan, in his article Why Do States Build 
Nuclear Weapons? Three models in search of a 
bomb, outlines three theoretical frameworks to 
help examine why states decide to build or 
refrain from developing nuclear weapons. The 
first theoretical framework is called the 
Security Model. This model has been the most 
supported theory to explain why some nations 
choose to create nuclear weapons. The Realist 
theory in political science argues that states 
exist in an anarchical international system and 
must rely on self-help to protect their 
sovereignty and national security (Sagan 57). 
This is based upon the idea that individuals are 
thirsty for power and act in accordance with 
their own self-interests. A state will seek to 
develop nuclear weapons when faced with a 
significant military threat to their security that 
cannot be met through alternative means 
(Sagan 54). Due to nuclear weapon’s 
destructive capabilities, a state that seeks to 
maintain national security must balance against 
any rival state that develops nuclear weapons 
by gaining access to a nuclear deterrent (Sagan 
57). Strong states pursue a form of internal 
balancing by adopting a policy of developing 
their own nuclear weapons, while weak states 
join a balancing alliance with a nuclear power 
as a means of extended deterrence (Sagan 57). 
Overall, Sagan’s theory on the Security Model 
argues that states build nuclear weapons to 
increase national security against foreign 
threats.  
     Kenneth Waltz, in his book Theory of 
International Politics, argues that nuclear 
power states are concerned with maintaining 
their position within the international system. 
States work harder to increase their strength, or 
combine with others, if they are falling behind 
(Waltz 127). Waltz places high importance on 
the structure of the international system. He 
states that the distinction between international 
and national realms of politics is not found in 
the use or the nonuse of force, but in their 
different structure (Waltz 104). Since the 
structure of the international system is one 
centered around the idea of self - help, security 
subordinates economic gain to political interest 
(Waltz 107). In fact, the structure of the 
international system forces states to become 
self-reliant and power seekers. By creating 
nuclear weapons, that state becomes less reliant 
on others. Additionally, the acquisition of 
nuclear capability is a potent technique to 
prevent the rise of nuclear competition amongst 
surrounding nations. Waltz highlights that 
weaker states will create an alliance with 
stronger nuclear power states as a form of 
protection. Nuclear weapons act as an 
instrument by dominant states to safeguard and 
legitimize their status in the international 
community. More importantly, the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons was designed for nuclear 
power states to maintain their control over 
nuclear weapon supplies by preventing and 
eliminating competition. 
     On a similar note, in The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons: A Debate Renewed, Kenneth Waltz 
argues that the growth of nuclear membership 
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will contribute to a safer world. He also states 
that despite nuclear proliferation efforts, 
nuclear weapons will continue to spread. Waltz 
claims that each state has a responsibility to 
protect themselves by establishing a form of 
security, that can be done by incorporating 
either the defensive ideal or deterrence theory.  
If war were to occur between two nuclear 
states, the fear of imminent escalation will 
prevent these states from attacking due to the 
uncertain realization of annihilation or survival 
(Waltz 9). Furthermore, he uses a Realist 
perspective saying that possession of nuclear 
weapons may slow arms races down, rather 
than speed them up. Additionally, less-
developed governments do not have the 
monetary means nor intellectual knowledge to 
formulate nuclear weapons. Lastly, highly 
unstable regimes are unlikely to initiate nuclear 
projects due to domestic political turmoil 
(Waltz 11). The spread of nuclear weapons will 
enhance a states’ national security.  This is all 
to say that the gradual spread of nuclear 
weapons should be more welcomed than feared 
(Waltz 45).  
     John Mearsheimer, in his book The Tragedy 
of Great Power Politics, argues that great-
power rivalry is still present in the international 
system, which contributes to a dangerous 
security competition between powerful nations. 
Great powers are always searching for 
opportunities to gain power over their rivals, 
with hegemony as their final goal 
(Mearsheimer 29). Mearsheimer emphasizes 
that the principle goal for great powers is to 
achieve regional hegemony. The acquisition of 
nuclear weapons is one- way great power states 
can maintain their security in an archaic 
international system as well as reach regional 
hegemony. Power states regard each other with 
suspicion and fear. The basis of this fear is that 
in a world where great powers have the 
capability to attack each other, any state bent 
on survival must at least be suspicious of other 
states and reluctant to trust them (Mearsheimer 
32). The consequences of falling victim to a 
possible attack by another powerful state 
further emphasizes the importance of being 
fearful of other nations. Political competition 
among states is a much more dangerous 
business than economic intercourse, because in 
extreme cases, war can lead to the destruction 
of states (Mearsheimer 33). Mearsheimer 
emphasizes that states in the international 
system aim to assure their security and 
survival. More specifically, each state tends to 
see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore 
it aims to provide for its own survival 
(Mearsheimer 33). Additionally, Mearsheimer 
mentions that states look for an opportunity to 
alter the balance of power. States employ a 
variety of means to shift the balance of power 
in their favor, even if doing so makes other 
states suspicious or even hostile (Mearsheimer 
34). By acquiring nuclear weapons, a state has 
the ability to change the balance of power and 
increase their own security while threatening 
the security of surrounding nations.  
     The origins of Liberal theory have roots in 
the eighteenth- century period of 
enlightenment. Liberalism holds that human 
nature is basically good and that people can 
improve their moral and material conditions 
(Mingst 83). More specifically, understanding 
laws allow people to improve their condition in 
society. Additionally, Liberalism views war as 
a result of inadequate institutions and 
misunderstanding between world leaders. 
Liberals are strong proponents of democracies 
and cooperation amongst state leaders. 
According to Liberal thinking, the expansion of 
human freedom is best achieved in 
democracies and through well-regulated market 
capitalism (Mingst 83).  
     Scott Sagan proposes a second model of 
nuclear proliferation that focuses on domestic 
actors who encourage or discourage 
governments from pursuing the bomb (Sagan 
63). In his article Why Do States Build Nuclear 
Weapons? Three models in search of a bomb, 
Sagan introduces the Domestic Politics Model 
to help explain nuclear proliferation. The 
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Domestic Politics model is similar to the 
international theory of Liberalism. Liberals 
believe that injustice, war, and aggression are 
not inevitable but can be moderated through 
institutional agencies and cooperative measures 
(Mingst 83). Because individuals are rational 
beings who have the ability to improve their 
social conditions, an unjust society is thus 
formed as a result of unjust government 
institutions. Adherents to the Domestic Politics 
Model argue that the decision to acquire 
nuclear weapons is based upon bureaucratic 
interests and parochial priorities. Additionally, 
domestic leaders create the conditions that 
favor weapons acquisition by encouraging 
extreme perceptions of foreign threats, 
promoting supportive politicians, and actively 
lobbying for increased defense spending 
(Sagan 64). In fact, initial ideas for the 
development of nuclear weapons is caused by 
the formation of domestic coalitions within the 
scientific-military-industrial complex that favor 
weaponization due to the influx of money and 
prestige flowing into the laboratories (Sagan 
64). In order to gain political and social 
support, scientific domestic coalitions persuade 
politicians within the executive and legislative 
branches to shape social perceptions regarding 
the benefits of nuclear weapons. The Domestic 
Politics Model views international security 
threats as being more malleable and merely as 
windows of opportunity through which 
parochial interests can jump (Sagan 65).  
      Robert Betts, in his article Paranoids, 
Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation, 
explains how the domestic political structure of 
a state has the ability to exert influence on the 
decision - making process regarding nuclear 
weapons. Betts argues that national security 
and status are the two fundamental motives to a 
nation acquiring nuclear weapons. However, he 
highlights the pivotal role that domestic 
political leaders have in the creation of nuclear 
weapons by analyzing Pygmy States, Paranoid 
States, and Pariah States. Pygmy States are 
concerned with national security and strongly 
believe that nuclear weapons can act as a 
powerful deterrent tool as well as a “tactical 
application against forces concentrated for land 
breakthroughs and amphibious landings” (Betts 
166). Paranoid States are concerned with 
national security however, this paranoia can 
make them believe in an unrealistic security 
threat. Lastly, Betts argues that Pariah States 
have the concerns of both Pygmy and Paranoid 
States, therefore being the most dangerous 
nations. Pariah States tend to have paranoid 
attitudes towards the international community 
thereby having the clearest incentives to 
increase their military power (Betts 167). This 
paranoid attitude is commonly recognized in an 
authoritarian regime where political power is 
centralized in one ruling force. Because there is 
minimal political mobilization in Pariah States, 
domestic political leaders hold a tremendous 
amount of influence in the nations’ military 
decision.  
      Scott Sagan introduces a third model that 
can help explain why some states choose 
nuclear weapons acquisition. This model 
focuses on non-material factors such as status 
and prestige. According to the Norms Model, 
state behavior is determined not by leaders’ 
cold calculations regarding national security 
interests or their parochial bureaucratic 
interests, but rather spearheaded by deeper 
norms and shared beliefs about what actions 
are legitimate and appropriate in international 
relations (Sagan 73). Within the realm of 
Sociology, new institutionalism refers to 
modern organizations and institutions coming 
to resemble each other not because of 
competition or rational learning but because 
institutions mimic each other (Sagan 74). New 
institutionalism emphasizes the importance of 
the roles, routines, and rituals of individuals 
and organizations. Such interests are shaped by 
the social roles actors are asked to play and 
thus are embedded in a social environment that 
promotes certain structures and behaviors as 
rational and legitimate and others as irrational 
and primitive (Sagan 74). Nuclear weapons are 
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viewed as a tool of modern society where states 
believe that they must possess them in order to 
look legitimate to surrounding states and the 
international community. Although the 
establishment of nuclear weapons may not be 
logical or cost efficient for some states, it is a 
symbol of modernity that possesses an 
abundance of power. 
     The international relations theory of 
Constructivism is similar to the Norms Model.  
It focuses on the power of ideas, norms, values 
and principles of a particular state in the 
embracement or refrainment of nuclear 
proliferation. Domestic political actors shape 
and influence a states’ decision in becoming a 
nuclear power state. According to political 
scientists, literature regarding the development 
and escalation of nuclear weapons is a result of 
norms within the international community. The 
norms perspective emphasizes the importance 
of power and coercion in influencing states to 
see the value of acquiring nuclear weapons. In 
fact, normative pressures may begin with the 
actions of entrepreneurial non-state actors, but 
their beliefs only have a significant influence 
once powerful state actors join the cause 
(Sagan, 75). Similarly, normative beliefs 
regarding nuclear weapons contributed to the 
creation of legal restrictions that prohibited 
their use during war. Additionally, nations who 
possess nuclear weapons use them as a fear 
tactic to deter other nations from acquiring 
nuclear armaments. 	CASE	STUIDES	ON	NUCLEAR	PROLIFERATION	IN	THE	MIDDLE	EAST			A.	ISRAEL						Established in 1948, the state of Israel can 
be classified as a success story. A transition 
from Holocaust to revival, Israel has become 
the region’s most formidable military power 
by turning a small, service economy into one 
of the world’s greatest centers for 
technological innovation (Cohen). Despite 
Israel’s success as a nation, it continues to be 
haunted by its past and the country’s survival 
is constantly at stake. Israel’s survival as a 
civilization surrounded by a hostile and 
populous Muslim world has contributed to an 
inner feeling of absolute fragility (Cohen).  
Israel viewed the establishment of nuclear 
weapons as a fundamental and critical 
necessity in order to preserve their security as 
a nation. In fact, nuclear weapons were seen 
as an important element of military power. 
The fear of a military attack by a hostile 
Arabian nation, it’s geographic location and 
the security protection of a major power such 
as the United States, were all contributing 
factors that led to Israel becoming a nuclear 
weapon state. 						Israel’s nuclear weapons program was 
conducted in secrecy with the help of France 
during the mid 1950s. Israel and France 
formed a cooperative relationship due to 
shared commercial and strategic interests in 
the formation of nuclear weapons. At the time, 
both France and Israel viewed this as an 
opportunity to maintain a degree of autonomy 
in foreign policy in the bipolar environment of 
the Cold War (Bahgat 91). Additionally, by 
helping Israel produce nuclear weapons, it 
helped France’s nuclear industry establish 
credibility in the international community. 
More importantly, what created such a 
powerful alliance between these two nations 
was a common enemy, Egyptian President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein. In 1956, 
Hussein nationalized the Suez Canal that was 
controlled by France and Britain. Due to this, 
the United States and Britain agreed to stop 
financing the construction of Egypt’s Aswan 
High Dam. This led to the “Suez Crisis” 
where Nasser declared martial law in the canal 
zone, seizing all operations of the Suez Canal 
Company (The Suez Crisis, Britannica). Israel 
decided to invade the canal while British and 
French troops withdrew. The Suez Crisis 
ended with Egypt being the victor contributing 
to more aggression towards Nasser by the 
French and the Israelis. For these reasons, 
France helped Israel achieve nuclearization. 	
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     The primary reason as to why Israel chose 
to nuclearize was due to national security, 
more specifically the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors 
began after the birth of the nation in 1948. The 
conflict involves issues relating to ethnic and 
religious differences as well as disputes over 
territorial claims and national integrity 
(Bickerton 18). Essentially, the struggle is 
between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews 
over territory that each nation claims is theirs. 
For Israel, the most important issue is that of 
national security. In 2006, the terrorist 
organization Hezbollah, launched an attack 
against Israel in order to pressure the country 
into releasing Lebanese prisoners. The war 
ended after thirty-four days and left over a 
thousand of Lebanese dead or displaced 
(Arab- Israel Wars, Britannica).  Additionally, 
Israel’s geographical location and close 
proximity to Palestine has made them a target 
for attacks. With an increase of military 
presence on the West Bank, Israel has not only 
become immune to the violence but has also 
increased conventional military power.  Due 
to the possibility of being attacked by its Arab 
neighbors, Israel’s primary motivation for 
establishing nuclear weapons was to enhance 
their national security.  
     The fundamental question that Israel now 
faces regarding nuclear weapons is whether 
their possession would serve or harm the 
nation’s national security (Cohen 34).  
The primary reason Israel established nuclear 
weapons was for national security reasons 
because the bomb acts as a deterrence for 
other nations. Israel established a unique style 
of proliferation and a code of nuclear conduct 
that set it apart from other nuclear-weapons 
states (Cohen 35).  Israel adopted an amimut 
bargain where the nation does not 
acknowledge its possession of the bomb 
despite the international community being 
aware that it does. Secrecy and non-
acknowledgement became the key ingredients 
for Israel’s amimut bargain with nuclear 
proliferation. In order for amimut to work, 
there should be enough credible evidence to 
deter enemies, but sufficient ambiguity and 
lack of acknowledgement to allow friends to 
look the other way (Cohen 46).  Firm 
knowledge that Israel has a nuclear arsenal 
much larger than needed would encourage 
Arab states to acquire nuclear weapons 
(Barnaby 46). Mutual nuclear deterrence 
would destabilize the Middle East, so by 
adopting the amimut bargain, Israel created a 
code of conduct by not recognizing itself as a 
nuclear weapon state. However, Israel was in 
favor of an effective Non Proliferation Treaty 
as a nuclear-weapons state, but as long as it 
faced existential threats, it was not willing to 
relinquish it (Cohen 40). Although national 
security was the primary force that 
spearheaded Israel’s decision to become a 
nuclear weapons state, United States toleration 
of Israel becoming a nuclear superpower was 
a secondary factor to the nation’s success in 
proliferation.  
     Since Israel’s founding in 1948, successive 
U.S. Presidents and many Members of 
Congress have demonstrated a commitment to 
Israel’s security and to a close U.S. - Israel 
cooperation (Zanotti). More importantly, the 
United States became tolerant of Israel’s 
nuclear weapons program because the two 
nations share common democratic values, 
economic partnerships, and security interests. 
Over time, U.S. -Israeli relations have evolved 
to incorporate legislation, bilateral 
agreements, and trade (Zanotti 1).  
     The United States was willing to tolerate 
Israel’s nuclear pursuit due to shared 
democratic values. In the first decades 
following its founding, Israeli society sought 
to build a country dedicated to Western liberal 
ideas and values (Zanotti 5).  The United 
States and Israel share the same values of 
tolerance, freedom, and democracy to all 
persons regardless of race, religion or 
ethnicity.  Both democratic nations hold the 
concept of liberty and freedom to the highest 
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regard. Israel’s deep and extensive 
commitment to democracy was a result of 
their admiration towards American culture and 
society. Israel’s government structure and 
political system is based upon free and fair 
elections, a mirror reflection of the United 
States. The U.S. - Israeli relationship was built 
upon similar fundamental democratic 
principles and values, which contributed to the 
United States becoming tolerant of Israeli 
nuclear weapons.  
     A second factor that contributed to the 
United States acceptance of Israeli nuclear 
proliferation is economic interests. Economic 
aid from the United States to Israel began after 
Israel’s victory in the Six Day War in 1967. 
The Six Day War was a bloody conflict 
between Israel and the Arab nations of Syria, 
Egypt and Jordan. Israel’s success in the Six 
Day War was largely due to its military 
strategic planning. By launching preemptive 
air strikes and coordinating ground offense 
strategies, Israeli victory completely altered 
the geographical landscape of the Middle East. 
This altercation greatly benefited the United 
States and Israel with regards to economic 
trade. In 1985, the two nations signed the Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA), which became the 
cornerstone of a vibrant U.S. - Israel economic 
relationship (Oren 128). Since then, Israel 
became one of the largest trading partners to 
the United States. This mutual economic 
relationship is primarily due to shared 
common values of a free and competitive 
market economy.  The constant dialogue 
between the governments of Israel and the 
United States to upgrade their economic 
partnership and to ensure continued prosperity 
has resulted in a strong alliance between these 
two nations (Oren 128).  
     The most significant factor that led to the 
United States acknowledging and accepting 
Israel’s nuclear weapons program is largely 
due to  security interests. Strong bilateral 
relations regarding security interests in the 
Middle East reinforced U.S. - Israel 
relationship regarding military aid, arms sales, 
and information sharing (Zanotti 16). More 
importantly, the United States helped 
transform Israel’s military through money and 
information sharing. In fact, Israel has 
generally been the largest annual recipient of 
U.S. foreign assistance by providing $3 billion 
in grants (Zanotti 18). Additionally, Congress 
continues to provide hundreds of millions of 
dollars in annual assistance beyond 
Administration-requested amounts for Israel’s 
Iron Dome anti-rocket system and joint U.S. -
Israel missile defense programs (Zanotti 20). 
United States aid was designed to maintain 
Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over 
neighboring militaries (Zanotti 16). By 
helping to reinforce Israel’s national security 
through military equipment and monetary aid, 
the United States is establishing regional 
stability in the Middle East. Due to similar 
democratic values and economic interests, 
Israel’s national security is of great 
importance to the United States. Essentially, 
the United States is aware that re-enforcing 
Israel’s national security will help in 
stabilizing the Middle East. More importantly, 
Israel’s national security is of equal benefit to 
the United States because it helps decrease 
traditional security threats from the 
surrounding Arab nations.  
     Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is 
largely influenced by the Realist theory where 
gaining nuclear weapons is the only way to 
guarantee the nation’s security. In fact, 
nuclear weapons were seen as insurance 
against the day when Israel loses its 
conventional military technological 
superiority over the Arabs and needs a 
deterrent against an Arab chemical attack 
(Barnaby 50). More importantly, a state will 
decide to go nuclear depending on the level 
and type of security threats that it faces and 
the nature of the interactions with its 
adversaries and its geo-strategic environment 
(Bahgat 8). Additionally, the realist approach 
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can be implemented to describe Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions.  	B.	IRAN	
     For more than two decades, Iran has 
aggressively invested time, money and 
resources into nuclear weapon capabilities. An 
examination into Iran’s motivations to acquire 
nuclear weapons requires a close evaluation 
on each analytical level. Each analytical level 
can offer specific insight into the reasons why 
Iran has chosen to proliferate. Taken together, 
system, state and individual level motivations 
can provide a fairly complete picture of Iran’s 
nuclear proliferation process (Mayer 1). Three 
factors that largely motivated Iran’s ambition 
to acquire nuclear weapons were domestic 
political interests, national prestige, and 
national security.   
     Iran’s nuclear energy program was initiated 
when Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was still 
in power. The Shah was determined to create 
an ambitious nuclear energy program in order 
to help Iran modernize as a nation. With the 
expertise of Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. 
Abdul Qadeer Kahn and with the aid of some 
nuclear weapon states, Iran embarked on an 
impressive scheme to evade export controls on 
dual use of technology (Greenblum 62). 
Additionally, Western countries like the 
United States supported Iran’s quest for 
nuclear energy after the country signed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970. 
This was a period where the Shah enjoyed 
good relations with the United States and 
other Western countries (Greenblum 61). In 
the early stages of developing nuclear energy, 
the United States provided support and aid to 
Iran’s nuclear energy program. Enriched fuel 
was supplied by an American company, AMF, 
where Iran agreed to purchase eight reactors 
(Bahgat 20). This purchase was used to create 
a uranium enrichment plant in order to 
generate nuclear energy which in turn had the 
potential to generate nuclear weapons. Since 
the United States wanted the Shah to rise to 
the role of Gulf protectorate, United States 
leaders looked the other way during Iran’s 
early nuclear foray (Mayer 7).  
     After the 1979 Islamic Revolution that 
overthrew the Shah of Iran, Ayatollah 
Khomeini seized power and halted the 
country’s nuclear weapons program. 
Khomeini strongly believed that nuclear 
weapons were a complete contradiction of 
what Islam stood for. However, despite 
damages to Iran’s nuclear energy facilities by 
the United States and the Iraqi government, 
Iran restarted its nuclear weapons program in 
the 1980s. Iran argued that their development 
of nuclear energy is motivated by the desire to 
generate electricity and to master the fuel 
cycle in order to become a supplier of nuclear 
fuel in the future (Chubin 24). Iran’s 
acquisition of fuel cycle includes facilities for 
plutonium reprocessing and highly enriched 
uranium, the two essential components needed 
to create nuclear weapons. Ultimately, Iran’s 
focus on super-enrichment, its history of 
concealment, and its virtually limitless supply 
of oil leaves most experts convinced that it is 
in fact seeking nuclear weapons. In fact, Iran 
strengthened their nuclear energy program by 
creating the Atomic Energy Organization 
responsible for operating nuclear energy and 
nuclear fuel cycle installations. A closer 
analysis of Iran’s nuclear weapons program 
reveals that the nation chose to proliferate due 
domestic political interests, national prestige 
and national security issues.  
     Iran’s nuclear ambitions are shaped by 
domestic political interests. Iranian policy is 
driven less by a rigid ideological revolutionary 
to one that encompasses different national 
interests in order to be more receptive to 
global norms and rules. Looking at the 
individual level of analysis, Iranian leaders are 
locked onto particular interests of which they 
will be very reluctant to let go (Mayer 4). 
These domestic political actors have 
persuaded government leaders and societal 
elites that nuclear weapons are needed for 
political power and military strength. As a 
POLITICAL	ANALYSIS	·	VOLUME	XXI·	#$#$	
	 9	
result, Iranian President Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani began improving economic and 
diplomatic relations with other world leaders. 
Internal political forces are utilized to 
persuade individuals that nuclear weapons 
programs are needed and essential for the 
nations’ national security, regardless if these 
weapons serve the states interest. In this 
realm, bureaucratic actors from civilian 
scientific institutions, special military units, 
and political arms form coalitions strong 
enough to control the governmental decision- 
making process, through controlling 
information or by direct political power 
(Mayer 60). Iran’s nuclear weapons program 
was facilitated by active participants that 
create conditions which favor proliferation to 
counter perceived national security threats 
(Mayer 60). Domestic political interests 
enticed Iran to expand their nuclear energy 
program and to establish nuclear weapons. 
Despite the influence of domestic actors in 
establishing nuclear weapons, the nuclear 
issue is a metaphor for Iran’s quest for greater 
respect and a wider regional and global role 
(Chubin 28).  
     A deeper analysis into Iran’s motivations to 
acquire nuclear weapons reveals a desire to 
gain national prestige. Most Iranians perceive 
their nation as a great civilization that has 
been deprived of its “rightful” status as a 
regional superpower by foreign intervention 
from the Russians, the British, and the 
Americans (Bahgat 36). This intense feeling 
of victimization has strengthened Iran’s desire 
to build nuclear weapons. Establishing an 
Iranian nuclear weapon facility would 
establish respect as well as fear to the 
surrounding Arab nations, Israel and the 
United States. Driven by popular sentiments, 
Iranians insist that they have an “inalienable 
right” to produce nuclear fuel and to be self-
sufficient in their nuclear program (Bahgat 
36). More specifically, Iran has chosen to be 
self-dependent in acquiring nuclear weapons 
by refusing to ask for aid and assistance from 
other nuclear weapon states. The choice to be 
self-reliant in creating nuclear weapons was 
largely motivated by Iran’s inability to trust 
foreign countries, more specifically the United 
States. In fact, Iranians accuse the United 
States of pursuing a policy of “Selective 
Proliferation” that permits some countries to 
enrich fuel and others not to (Bahgat 37). This 
double standard of “selective proliferation” is 
evidently seen through the United States 
reaction of discovering Israel’s nuclear 
weapons capabilities and later accepting it.  
     The primary motivating factor for Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions is national security issues. 
The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran 
would act as a deterrence strategy from 
conventional and existential threats by Iraq, 
Israel and the United States. The potential 
threat from Iraq is the most persuasive reason 
for Iran to consider acquiring nuclear deterrent 
(Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Options: Issues and 
Analysis). Because Iraq is known to have 
sought nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons of mass destruction, Iran’s national 
security is threatened by the possibility of 
such an attack. In fact, Iraq continues to 
remain determined in creating nuclear and 
chemical capabilities despite the International 
community’s condemnation of these actions. 
The fear of an Iraqi chemical attack became a 
reality in 1988 during the Iran-Iraq war when 
Iraqi Kurds used chemical weapons against 
Iranian troops. International inaction 
reinforced Iran’s view that arming themselves 
with nuclear weapons will be for defense and 
deterrence purposes. The only way to ensure 
the nation’s national security and safety is to 
acquire the bomb.  
     Israel is often depicted by Iranians either as 
a direct threat or as a state with imperial 
motivations (Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Options: 
Issues and Analysis). More specifically, Iran 
views Israel as a regional competitor that was 
created by the United States to balance the 
power in the Middle East. Despite the current 
animosity between Iran and Israel, these two 
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nations were not always rivals. It was not until 
the defeat of Iraq in 1991 and the United 
States military intervention in 2003 that 
hostile tension between Iran and Israel 
surmounted. To make matters worse, the 
differing ideological perspectives and Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions only heightened tensions 
between these two nations. Additionally, Iran 
views Israel as a military and geopolitical rival 
due to Israel’s strong relationship with the 
United States. With Israel as the only regional 
state considering military action against Iran 
as its nuclear efforts move forward, the rivalry 
between Israel and Iran has emerged as a 
defining feature of the current regional 
environment (Israel and Iran: A Dangerous 
Rivalry). Gaining nuclear weapons will only 
help reinforce Iran’s security and decrease 
conventional military threats from Israel and 
the United States. The ability to acquire 
nuclear weapons is strongly motivated by 
Iran’s national security as opposed to 
domestic political interests and national 
prestige. Although national security is one 
factor that has contributed to Iran seeking 
nuclear weapons, the United States hostile 
response is what contributed to their lack of 
success.  
      The United States continues to be 
intolerant towards Iran’s motivations to 
acquire nuclear weapons. United States 
hostility towards Iran’s nuclear ambitions is 
largely due to the unstable relationship these 
two nations have with each other. More 
specifically, the establishment of nuclear 
weapons by Iran would threaten United States 
interests in the region. U.S. - Iran relations 
have been adversarial since the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution in Iran where Mohammad Reza 
Shah, who was known to have ties to the 
United States, was overthrown. Orchestrated 
by Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolution led to 
the establishment of an Islamic republic in 
Iran, contributing to even more tension 
between these two nations.  
 Since the 1979 revolution, the United 
States has consistently identified Iran’s 
support for militant Middle Eastern groups as 
a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies 
(U.S.-Iran Tensions and Implications). Since 
2002, the United States has attempted to 
constrain Iran’s nuclear weapons program 
through the implementation of diplomatic 
agreements, economic sanctions and military 
deployments.  In 2015, Iran and the six world 
powers met to establish a deal that would limit 
Iran’s nuclear program by increasing 
surveillance in exchange for uplifting 
economic sanctions imposed by the United 
States. However, in May 2018, the Trump 
Administration withdrew the United States 
from the 2015 nuclear agreement, formally 
known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA) (U.S.-Iran Tensions and 
Implications).  The Trump Administration 
argued that the agreement did not address the 
broad range of U.S. concerns about Iranian 
behavior and would not permanently preclude 
Iran from developing nuclear weapons (U.S.-
Iran Tensions and Implications). As a result, 
the United States turned to economic and 
military pressure in order to deter Iran from 
advancing their nuclear weapons program.  
      Ever since the Trump Administration 
withdrew from the nuclear deal with Iran in 
2018, the administration has pursued a policy 
of Maximum Pressure in the hopes of 
negotiating a better agreement with Iran. The 
policy of Maximum Pressure includes 
economic sanctions and military action by 
United States Armed Forces. For example, in 
May 2019, the Trump Administration ended a 
U.S. sanctions exception for any country 
purchasing Iranian oil (U.S.-Iran Tensions and 
Implications). This course of action was taken 
to drive Iranian oil exports down, thus dealing 
a devastating blow to their economy. 
Additionally, the United States ended waivers 
under the Iran Freedom and Counter-
Proliferation Act, that allowed countries to 
help Iran remain within stockpile limits (U.S.-
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Iran Tensions and Implications). The Trump 
Administration responded militarily by 
planning to deploy the USS Abraham Lincoln 
Carrier Strike Group to the region and sending 
a bomber task force to the Persian Gulf in the 
hopes of cultivating fear amongst the Iranian 
government (U.S.-Iran Tensions and 
Implications). Unfortunately, this tactic by the 
Trump Administration was unsuccessful. The 
Administration responded by allocating 
immediate foreign military sales exceeding 
over $8 billion to Saudi Arabia in an effort to 
“deter further Iranian adventurism in the Gulf 
and throughout the Middle East” (U.S.-Iran 
Tensions and Implications).  
      Despite the Trump Administrations 
Maximum Pressure policy efforts, Iran 
responded by demonstrating its ability to harm 
global commerce and United States interests 
while raising concerns regarding nuclear 
activities. In June 2019, Iran shot down an 
unmanned aerial surveillance aircraft, 
claiming that it had entered Iranian airspace 
over the Gulf of Oman (U.S.-Iran Tensions 
and Implications). The downing of the 
American drone was a clear message to the 
United States that Iran will defend its borders 
against any foreign aggressor. Iran’s 
retaliation against the United States economic 
sanctions and military deployment efforts did 
not stop there. In September 2019, Iran 
launched a large and sophisticated attack on 
Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais. 
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated 
that Iran has now launched an unprecedented 
attack on the world’s energy supply (U.S.-Iran 
Tensions and Implications). As a result, the 
attack contributed to a significant portion of 
the Saudi oil fields being shut down. The 
attack on the Saudi oil field primarily 
devastated United States interest with oil. 
Despite United States efforts to punish Iran’s 
decades-long history of destructive tactics and 
nuclear ambitions, their efforts have only 
contributed to more hostility between the two 
nations. This hostility further exceeds Iran’s 
ambitions to nuclearize and become a nuclear 
weapon state to defend itself from the United 
States and its allies. Iran’s efforts to nuclearize 
is primarily due to national security reasons as 
well as the intense feeling of victimization it 
has towards the United States. 	C.	SAUDI	ARABIA		
Very little attention is given to Saudi 
Arabia’s capabilities to create nuclear 
weapons in the Middle East. Being the third 
giant state on the Persian Gulf, the question 
must be asked: Is Saudi Arabia seeking 
nuclear weapons capability? No concrete 
evidence has been found to suggest Saudi 
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Although 
Saudi Arabia has the financial capability to 
create nuclear weapons, the nation does not 
experience a severe national security threat 
unlike Israel and Iran. More importantly, close 
security cooperation with the United States 
has left Saudi Arabia with little incentive to 
acquire nuclear weapons (Bahgat 65). Even 
more so, the United States commitment to the 
survival of the Saudi regime and the country’s 
territorial integrity has contributed to no 
security threats and is the best guarantee that 
the nation will not seek nuclear weapons 
(Bahgat 66). Saudi Arabia’s geostrategic 
placement and close alliance with the United 
States are the two significant factors to help 
explain why such a wealthy nation has chosen 
nuclear restraint.  
Saudi Arabia’s geostrategic characteristics 
has significantly shaped the nation’s security 
environment. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is 
the largest and most powerful state in the 
Arabian Peninsula as well as an important 
actor in oil affairs (Peterson 7). Saudi Arabia 
has the smallest population in comparison to 
its rivals in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia’s 
national security was of major concern during 
the Cold War when the Soviet Union 
pressured the nation to become Communist. 
The Soviet Union and surrounding Arab 
nationalist regimes presented a major security 
threat to the survival of the nation. 
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Additionally, like most of the Arab nations, 
the Saudis resented the establishment of the 
Israeli nation. In an effort to create peace, a 
meeting took place between U.S. President 
Franklin Roosevelt and Saudi King Saud ibn 
Abd al-Aziz where two agreements were 
established. Despite this agreement between 
the two nations, Saudi Arabia continued to 
view Israel as a contributor to the high 
instability in the Middle East. But, instead of 
relying on the Soviet Union in the struggle 
against Israel, Saudi Arabia sought the help 
and alliance of western countries, particularly 
the United States, to exert pressure on the 
Jewish state (Bahgat 69). A comprehensive 
solution to regain back stability in the region 
can only be accomplished if Israel gives back 
Arab territories that was acquired after the Six 
Day War. Over time, Saudi Arabia has joined 
United States peace negotiations with Israel in 
an effort to decrease hostility between the two 
nations. Although Saudi Arabia blamed the 
creation of Israel for the instability in the 
Middle East, it never planned to confront 
Israel with a conventional or unconventional 
military attack. This is all to say, due to Saudi 
Arabia's geostrategic location, the nation did 
not gain any hostile enemies, therefore not 
having any security reasons to establish 
nuclear weapons.  
The nature of the relationship between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran did not contribute to 
any national security risks for either country. 
In fact, both nations share important 
similarities such as  foreign policy 
orientations, Islam, oil, regional security and 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has shaped 
their relationship. Iran and Saudi Arabia share 
similar foreign policy and security orientations 
primarily throughout the Cold War. Both 
nations sought to contain and resist the spread 
of Communism to their country. Despite their 
close relationship in containing communism, 
Saudi Arabia continued to act suspiciously 
towards the Shah of Iran. As a result, Saudi 
Arabia viewed its alliance with the United 
States as an important factor for the nations’ 
security. To demonstrate the nation’s 
commitment to nuclear restraint, Saudi Arabia 
signed a memorandum of understanding on 
Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation in 2008 
(Squassoni, 8). No credible evidence suggests 
that Saudi Arabia has ever pursued nuclear 
weapons or has the ambition to do so. Shortly 
thereafter the signing of the Civil Nuclear 
Energy Cooperation, the U.S. Department of 
State released a statement stating, “Saudi 
Arabia has stated its intent to rely on 
international markets for nuclear fuel and to 
not pursue sensitive nuclear technologies” 
(Squassoni, 8). Additionally, being a non-
nuclear state member of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, Saudi Arabia has 
welcomed comprehensive safeguards in order 
to further the objective of a weapons free 
zone. Because Saudi Arabia does not suffer 
any security threats, the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons is not needed to deter potential 
attackers.  
One factor as to why Saudi Arabia 
continues to be a non-nuclear weapon state is 
its close alliance with the United States. For 
more than seven decades, Saudi Arabia’s 
relationship with the United States centered 
around trade, technical cooperation and 
military and civilian contracts (Safran, 210). 
More specifically, these interests centered 
around oil supplies, security and the 
containment of militant Islam. Unlike Israel 
and the United States who share similar 
democratic values, the United States 
relationship with Saudi Arabia is 
predominantly shaped by economic and 
security interests for both countries. Saudi 
Arabia is the second leading source of 
imported oil to the United States, providing 
just under one million barrels per day of oil to 
the U.S market (U.S. Relations with Saudi 
Arabia). In fact, Saudi trade with the United 
States grew tremendously from $2.6 billion in 
1974 to $10.2 billion in 1978 (Safran, 215).  
Saudi Arabia’s ability to quickly ramp up oil 
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production has made the United States 
dependent on Saudi oil. However, an Iranian 
nuclear weapons program would trigger Saudi 
Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons of their 
own. Bruce Riedel of the Brookings 
Institution suggested in 2016 that Saudi 
Arabia is less concerned about Iranian nuclear 
weapons that Iran’s quest for regional 
hegemony because it believes it is covered by 
the U.S. nuclear umbrella (Squassoni, 12). As 
a result, Saudi Arabia benefits from the United 
States nuclear umbrella, a guarantee that the 
nation will prevent and defend Saudi Arabia 
from any potential nuclear attacks.  
A second factor which led to a strong 
alliance between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia is largely due to security reasons. After 
the September 11 attacks, President Bush 
informed the world that “either you are with 
us, or you are with the terrorists (Bahgat 80). 
Saudi Arabia publicly condemned the 
terrorists’ attacks and supported the United 
States position to go to war. The Bush 
Administration was content with Saudi efforts 
in cooperation with the War on Terror. This 
mutual alliance regarding security only 
strengthened the United States - Saudi 
relationship. The unofficial alliance between 
the United States and Saudi Arabia is likely to 
endure for decades to come. Allying with the 
United States has contributed significantly to 
an increase in Saudi security within the 
region. Saudi oil has greatly benefited the 
United States. Additionally, heightened 
military action by the United States has 
contributed significantly to advancing Saudi 
Arabia’s national security. The extensive 
economic and military ties between Riyadh 
and Washington offers no reason as to why 
Saudi Arabia should acquire nuclear weapons. 
Since Saudi Arabia benefits greatly from an 
economic and military relationship with the 
United States, by creating nuclear weapons, 
this mutually beneficial relationship will 
tremendously impact the security and the 
economy of Saudi Arabia. More importantly, 
the American -Saudi alliance is built on shared 
interests, not common values. Despite 
growing security uncertainties in the Middle 
East, Saudi Arabia should not be considered a 
serious nuclear proliferation threat (Bahgat 
86).  	THE	DETERMINING	FACTORS	TO	NUCLEAR	PROLIFERATION		
National security and United States 
interests are the two determining factors 
regarding nuclear proliferation in the Middle 
East. The Security Model is one theoretical 
framework that provides insight into the 
motivations of nuclear acquisition by Israel 
and Iran. The security model, similar to the 
international theory of Realism, argues that 
states will seek to develop nuclear weapons 
when they face a significant military threat to 
their security that cannot be met through 
alternative means (Sagan 54). Israel chose to 
proliferate due to national security reasons. 
Specifically, the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 
Persian Gulf motivated Israel to seek nuclear 
capabilities. The creation of the Jewish state 
after World War II and the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons by Israel significantly altered 
the balance of power in the region. The 
possibility of a nuclear attack by Israel 
contributed to Iran’s quest for nuclear 
weapons. Additionally, Iran viewed the United 
States military involvement as a threat to the 
states’ sovereignty and national security. After 
funding both sides of the Iran-Iraq War, the 
United States intervened when Iraq invaded 
Kuwait resulting in the 1991 Gulf War. After 
the September 11 attacks, the Bush 
Administration invaded Afghanistan in hopes 
of capturing Osama Bin Laden. Two years 
later, the United States intervened in Iraq 
because American intelligence believed 
Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass 
destruction. Iraq’s ambition to attain nuclear 
weapons capabilities was an additional threat 
to Iran’s national security. Ongoing American 
military presence in the Middle East left Iran 
feeling vulnerable and powerless, which 
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increased their interest in gaining nuclear 
weapons for security purposes.  
       According to Realist theory, every time 
one state develops nuclear weapons to balance 
against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear 
threat to another state in the region (Sagan 58). 
Saudi Arabia’s commitment to refrain from 
developing nuclear weapons can be explained 
by the security model. Saudi Arabia is a 
wealthy nation that has the capability to 
acquire nuclear weapons. However, Saudi 
Arabia does not have the incentive to 
proliferate because the nation does not have a 
significant security threat. Despite Israel’s 
creation of nuclear weapons and Iran’s 
aspiration to proliferate, these two nations are 
not a security threat to Saudi Arabia.  
       A secondary factor that helps to explain 
nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is 
United States’ interests. Israel and Saudi 
Arabia share a mutually beneficial partnership 
with the United States. Because of this, Saudi 
Arabia is protected under the United States 
nuclear umbrella. United States interests in 
providing military aid to Israel and Saudi 
Arabia will contribute to stabilization and the 
balance of power in the Middle East. United 
States alliances with Israel and Saudi Arabia 
are motivated by the ability to dominate and 
control foreign policy efforts in the region. By 
having the United States as a close ally, Israel 
and Saudi Arabia benefit from economic and 
military aid that strengthens each nations’ 
national security. The United States is highly 
invested in maintaining the close relationship 
that it has with Israel and Saudi Arabia because 
of its ability to maintain the balance of power 
in the Middle East. In contrast, Iran does not 
share in a mutually beneficial alliance with the 
United States, primarily due to U.S. military 
involvement in the region. Ever since the 1979 
Iranian revolution that overthrew the Shah, the 
United States relationship with Iran has been 
hostile. Tension escalated between these two 
nations after the United States discovered Iran 
revamped its nuclear weapons program for 
national security purposes. An Iranian nuclear 
weapons program would be a threat to the 
United States and United States interests. More 
specifically, nuclear weapons in the hands of 
an Iranian regime would endanger Israel’s 
security and destabilize the balance of power in 
the region.  	CONCLUSION	
The proliferation of nuclear weapons 
states in the Middle East poses a significant 
threat to United States’ interests, international 
security and the stability of the region. Efforts 
by the international community to halt the 
spread of nuclear weapons, especially by rogue 
regimes, have been conducted through 
diplomatic negotiations and military 
intervention. In order to contain the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United 
States has expanded its security presence by 
forming alliances with Israel and Saudi Arabia 
to maintain the balance of power in the Middle 
East. Longstanding security alliance between 
the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia has 
helped the U.S. contain certain rogue regimes 
from acquiring nuclear weapons. The two 
determining factors to explain nuclear 
proliferation and nuclear restrain in the Middle 
East are national security and United States 
interests and alliances.  
       The foreign policy theories of Liberalism 
and Constructivism fail to answer a critical 
question: why do some states choose to acquire 
nuclear weapons and others choose not to? 
Although domestic political interests and 
national prestige are two factors that can 
explain Iran’s motivations to acquire nuclear 
weapons, national security was the overarching 
reason why this nation wants weapons. 
Similarly, national security was the primary 
force that spearheaded Israel’s decision to 
become a nuclear weapon state due to its 
strategic geographical location. Saudi Arabia 
has little incentive to build nuclear weapons 
capabilities largely because the nation does not 
face a direct security threat. Nuclear 
proliferation in Israel and Iran’s ambition to 
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acquire nuclear weapons aligns significantly 
with the realist perspective and the Security 
Model outlined by Scott Sagan. A state will 
seek to develop nuclear weapons when faced 
with a significant military or security threat 
(Sagan 54).  
 The United States has been and continues to 
be a powerful actor in international foreign 
policy. The U.S. interests and alliances with a 
nation dominates international foreign policy 
and is a second factor in explaining nuclear 
proliferation in the Middle East. Due to shared 
democratic values, economic and military 
interests, the United States was tolerant 
towards Israel’s nuclear weapons program. 
Additionally, the United States continues to 
provide military assistance in the form of 
weapons, monetary aid, and military 
knowledge in order to help Israel’s national 
security. The U.S. is invested in Israel’s 
national security because the Israeli military 
has prevented radical nationalist movements 
that would alter regional stability and security 
in the region. A similar comparison is drawn to 
Saudi Arabia’s decision to refrain from 
acquiring nuclear weapons. Because the 
nations do not have a perceived security threat, 
acquiring nuclear weapons would be more 
costly than helpful. Additionally, Saudi Arabia 
continues to enjoy and benefit from United 
States economic and security resources. 
Therefore, if Saudi Arabia was to initiate a 
nuclear weapons program, it would negatively 
impact the nation’s relationship with the United 
States. Since Saudi Arabia has continued to 
refrain from creating nuclear weapons, despite 
the resources and monetary means to create a 
program, the nation continues to benefit from 
the protection of the United States nuclear 
umbrella. On the other hand, Iran’s hostile 
relationship with the United States has posed 
severe security issues for the nation, thereby 
seeking nuclear weapons as a tool for security 
and deterrence. Overall, the United States will 
continue to be a dominant force in international 
relations and foreign policy. The findings of 
this thesis conclude that national security and 
United States’ interests and alliances are the 
two determining factors to explain why some 
nations in the Middle East choose to pursue 
nuclear weapons and why others have not.  	REFERENCES			
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